POLITENESS THEORIES
I will now briefly review two of the most useful
politeness theories, noting that they were developed to account for
face-to-face interactions, not literary discourse. The relevance of such
theories to dialogue between characters in fiction is obvious; its relevance to
the communicative flow between narrator and reader is less clear, but I shall
try to show that, in spite of the fact that the invitation to read anything can
be regarded as an imposition, and so inherently impolite, politeness does have
a role here.
1. BROWN AND LEVINSON’S POLITENESS THEORY
Brown and Levinson (1987) develop a widely
accepted theory of politeness, which they consider is cross-culturally valid.
Briefly, it holds that people are motivated by their need to maintain their
‘face’ (in the sociological sense, developed by Goffman 1967): the need to be
approved of by others, and to maintain a sense of self-worth. Brown and
Levinson consider that ‘face’ has two aspects:
1. Negative face: the right to freedom of action
and freedom from imposition.
2. Positive face: the need to be appreciated by
others, and to maintain a positive self-image.
Positive and negative face needs can readily
conflict. For example, if you ask me for a loan, you are threatening my
negative face; if I make the loan, I am maintaining my positive face, at the
expense of my pocket. If you decide not to ask for the loan and, for want of
£5, are compelled to walk home and catch a cold, I may be most upset, since you
have implied that we are not friends, and thus damaged my positive face. These
conflicts explain why we engage in all sorts of redressive strategies (for a
full account, see Brown and Levinson). At one extreme, we avoid the face
threatening act (FTA) – as when a loan is not requested. Or a variety of
indirect hinting strategies may be employed. You may comment on the inclement
weather, and remark that you have no money for a taxi. You may remind me of our
friendship (for example, by using a term of endearment or nickname), or
otherwise signal that we are members of the same social group. Politeness
strategies explain why it is that we can (in English) use the imperative when
we are making an inherently polite offer
– have a sherry
whereas
when we are making a request we are conventionally indirect
– can you pass the salt.
The details of Brown and Levinson’s exhaustive
analysis of the ways in which we manage to appear polite and still get our own
way need not be considered here. But it should be noted that certain topics,
such as metaphor and irony, of great significance to literary discourse, can be
considered in the light of politeness phenomena, as will be discussed below.
2. LEECH’S POLITENESS THEORY
Another method of approaching politeness was
developed by Leech (1983: 81): ‘minimize (other things being equal) the
expression of impolite beliefs’ and ‘maximize (other things being equal) the
expression of polite beliefs.’ To this politeness principle he attaches a
number of maxims (such as modesty, tact, approbation, sympathy, generosity,
agreement). Politeness in this model is essentially a scalar phenomenon: the
degree of imposition on the hearer will normally condition the degree of
indirectness, mitigation or other politeness marker from the speaker. Thus, Answer
the phone is less polite than a request. Of course, much depends on the
relationship between the interlocutors; we can be more direct with intimates.
If the hearer is aware that it is impossible for the speaker to answer the
phone, the imperative might not be considered inappropriate. A difficulty with
his analysis is that it seems to lead to a proliferation of maxims on an ad
hoc basis (as Thomas 1995 notes). One of his suggestions is that there may
be an interest principle, which would explain why we use hyperbole
(overstatement) and litotes (understatement). These can be considered to be
part of politeness: if I am telling a story, and grossly over or understate the
reactions of the participants, this may marginally increase the interest of the
narrative. This is quite common in oral stories: expressions like I nearly
died can of course refer to an unfortunate incident during surgery, but
they are more likely to convey an attitude to events in the narrative. So, when
a young woman has a dancing partner she dislikes, the narrator says The
moment of her release from him was extacy (Austen, Pride and Prejudice,
1813/1972: 133). The motivation for saying not bad or not
uninteresting when one means that it was excellent (or very bad) or most
interesting, may be, as Leech suggests, a counterweight to hyperbole, and
guarantee that the speaker is observing the CP. Litotes was very characteristic
of Old English poetry; the Beowulf poet tells of the founder of the
Danish royal line, who was a foundling. On his death, he was given a ship
funeral, laden with no fewer gifts and treasures than he had when he arrived:
that is, it was laden with a great many more.
A member of a group performing at the Edinburgh
Fringe is asked about the reviews: ‘Not great,’ Charles Collins admitted.
‘We’ve only had four,’ he went on, knowing if he didn’t say it someone else
would. ‘They weren’t exactly complimentary’ (Rankin, ‘A Good
Hanging’, 1992/1998: 114). It is clear that the reviews must have been
appalling. So why not say so? Amour-propre, perhaps. The speaker is both
author and director of the failed play. It can hardly be to spare the feelings
of his companions, who know the situation. But mitigating devices, in such
circumstances, might be accounted a politeness phenomenon.